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Abstract—Monitoring kernel object modification of virtual
machine is widely used by virtual-machine-introspection-based
security monitors to protect virtual machines in cloud computing,
such as monitoring dentry objects to intercept file operations, etc.
However, most of the current virtual machine monitors, such
as KVM and Xen, only support page-level monitoring, because
the Intel EPT technology can only monitor page privilege.
If the out-of-virtual-machine security tools want to monitor
some kernel objects, they need to intercept the operation of
the whole memory page. Since there are some other objects
stored in the monitored pages, the modification of them will
also trigger the monitor. Therefore, page-level memory monitor
usually introduces overhead to related kernel services of the
target virtual machine. In this paper, we propose a low-overhead
kernel object monitoring approach to reduce the overhead caused
by page-level monitor. The core idea is to migrate the target
kernel objects to a protected memory area and then to monitor
the corresponding new memory pages. Since the new pages only
contain the kernel objects to be monitored, other kernel objects
will not trigger our monitor. Therefore, our monitor will not
introduce runtime overhead to the related kernel service. The
experimental results show that our system can monitor target
kernel objects effectively only with very low overhead.
Index Terms—Kernel object monitor, Kernel object migration,
System call reuse, Virtual machine introspection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Monitoring kernel objects is widely used to intercept kernel
events to protect computer security dynamically. For instance,
monitoring the modification of dentry or inode objects (Linux
virtual file system cache object) can intercept file operations
since file operations will change the target file’s dentry or in-
ode object. The modification of a process’ file descriptor table
indicates that the process opens or closes files. Monitoring
socket objects can intercept network events.
With the development of cloud computing and virtualiza-
tion, more and more operating systems are running inside vir-
tual machines (VM) of clouds and data centers. Virtualization
provides a new architecture to monitoring operating systems
running in VMs. Some security problems in ubiquitous com-
puting system as discussed by [1]–[3] can be mitigated by
this convenient deployment of virtualized cloud instances. In
virtualization architecture, Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)
provides virtualization service for VMs and has the highest
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privilege. It isolates different VMs and is strongly isolated
from VMs. Therefore, security monitors running in VMM
instead of guest VMs are more secure and transparent. This
monitor technology is called Virtual Machine Introspection
(VMI) [4].
By using VMI technology, many security systems [5]–[7]
are proposed to monitor the modification of kernel objects
in order to monitor VMs. CFWatcher [5] intercepts dentry
and inode object modification to protect VM filesystem in
real time. When the target file’s dentry or inode object is
modified, the corresponding file operation can be intercepted
by the monitor running inside VMM. RTKDSM [7] monitors
many kernel objects (such as FILE OBJECT) to achieve VMI.
However, these out-of-VM monitors leverage Intel VT or Intel
EPT technologies to perform page-level monitoring, which
may introduce overhead to the target VM. Since other kernel
objects are also stored in the monitored memory pages, the
accesses to them will also trigger the monitor. The false
triggering improves the overhead of these tools. Therefore,
how to reduce the overhead of these page-level monitors is
important.
In this paper, a low-overhead kernel object monitor ap-
proach is proposed to reduce the overhead of page-level VMI-
based kernel object monitors. The core idea is to migrate
the target kernel objects to a protected memory area. As a
result, the accesses to other kernel objects will not cause false
triggering. Our system is an agentless approach running inside
VMM and the privileged VM so it can be used to enhance the
VMI monitors. Our target is kernel objects, so we do not need
to modify the target VM’s kernel. Our system is automated,
which means the allocation of the protected memory area and
the object migration are performed automatically.
To build protected memory area automatically, we leverage
system call reuse technique to let the target VM build it. After
that, we analyze the target VM’s memory to detect the target
object and the related pointers. An automated pointer detection
method is proposed to detect the target object’s related pointers
automatically. Then, the target object is migrated to the
protected memory area and the related pointers are updated
to point to the new migrated object. Finally, the protected
memory area is monitored and protected by using hardware-
based events.
In summary, our paper has several contributions, which are
as follows.
• A low-overhead monitoring approach is proposed to
reduce the overhead of VMI-based page-level kernel
object monitors, which migrates target kernel objects to
a protected memory area.
• Protected memory areas can be created automatically by
leveraging system call reuse technique. An automated
kernel object migration method is proposed.
• The experimental results show that our system can ef-
fectively reduce the runtime overhead of VMI-based
monitors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
summarizes the related work. The system design and imple-
mentation are described in Section III. Section IV evaluates the
effectiveness and performance of our system. The conclusion
is given in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
During the development of cloud computing, security is
always a hot topic. Some related security issues are studied
in [8]–[11]. To protect VMs, Virtual Machine Introspection
[4] technology is proposed. It is an out-of-the-box technology
to monitor VMs and is widely used in cloud security. In
the virtualization architecture, VMM provides virtualization
service for VMs , which has the highest privilege and is
strongly isolated from the VMs. As a result, the security
monitor running inside the VMM can access the VM hardware
execution state. Based on VMI technology, many security
monitor systems [12]–[14] have been proposed to protect
VMs. Compared with the in-VM security tools [15], [16],
VMI-based monitors are more secure and transparent.
Many VMI-based security monitors [5]–[7] enhance the
VM security by intercepting the modification of VM kernel
objects. CFWatcher [5] is a real-time filesystem monitor which
can intercept every access to the target files by monitoring
the corresponding dentry or inode objects. RTKDSM [7]
enhances VM security by monitoring many kernel objects
(such as FILE OBJECT) from outside. Because of the page-
level intercepting, the extra overhead is introduced.
The semantic gap is a major challenge for VMI-based
monitors. Monitors running inside the VMM can only obtain
the hardware binary execution information, but they need
the high-level execution information (such as system calls)
to perform introspection. The gap between binary execution
information and high-level information is called semantic
gap. To narrow the semantic gap, many works have been
proposed in recent years. Virtuoso [17] reuses VM code to
generate inspection tools in VMM automatically. Firstly, it
traces the execution of programs running inside VMs to get
some necessary code pieces. Then, it modifies and reuses them
to generate the inspection tools, which can run in the VMM.
SYRINGE [18] reuses some functions inside the target VM.
A break point is injected in the target VM. When this point
is triggered, SYRINGE suspends the normal VM execution
and then lets the VM execute some specific reuse functions
to bridge the semantic gap. In addition, it can verify the
integrity of the reuse functions. ShadowContext [19] leverages
system calls redirection technology to bridge sematic gap. By
converting a process within the target VM to a dummy process,
ShadowContext leverages the dummy process to invoke some
system calls to narrow the semantic gap automatically. SAVM
[20] and HyperShell [21] are some in-VM management tools,
which also leverage the system call reuse technology.
To provide security service for cloud users, many systems
have been proposed. CloudVMI [22] provides the VMI inter-
face for cloud customers, which can help them enhance the
VM security. Furnace [23] enables cloud customers to execute
their VMI-based code in the VMM with high performance.
Several papers (e.g., [1]–[3], [9], [10])have studied related
issues.
In this paper, we aim to reduce the runtime overhead of
VMI-based kernel object monitors, which can be used by many
VMI-based security monitors.
III. DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION
A. System Overview
The traditional approach is to directly monitor the memory
pages of the target kernel objects. Therefore, the accesses to
other kernel objects will cause false triggering and unnecessary
overhead. To solve this problem, we allocate a protected
memory area then migrate target kernel objects automatically.
There are some requirements of our system.
• Effectiveness. Firstly, all of the related pointers after the
kernel object migration should be modified. It is however,
a challenge to find all of the pointers. Searching the entire
kernel memory to look them up is a possible way. We can
check if the memory data equals to the pointer. But, it
is not easy to identify whether the content is a related
pointer or just a data. Modifying the wrong memory area
may cause VM crash. In addition, the release of original
kernel object is another problem. After the migration is
completed, it will inevitably cause memory holes if the
original kernel object cannot be effectively released.
• Performance. The object migration should introduce
acceptable overhead to the target VM and can highly
improve the performance of the traditional VMI-based
kernel object monitors.
• Security and transparency. The monitor should be fully
secured and be isolated from the target VM.
In order to meet these requirements, we propose a low-
overhead kernel object monitoring approach by using kernel
object migration. The overall system architecture is illustrated
in Figure 1.
The whole system includes monitor module, memory op-
eration module and policy engine, where memory operation
module could be divided into memory migration module and
memory allocation module. The whole system is deployed in
VMM and the privileged VM, which is completely isolated
from the target VM. More details about work flow are as
follows:
Fig. 1. System Architecture
Step 1. With the help of the VMI-based toolkit LIBVMI
and system call reuse technology, memory allocation module
allocates protected memory pages in the target VM kernel
memory space, then obtains the start address of protected area.
Step 2. The memory migration module copies original
objects to a protected memory area. All of the related pointers
are retrieved based a proposed policy and re-pointed to the new
kernel objects. Finally, the memory space of original kernel
objects will be released.
Step 3. The monitor module dynamically monitors all of the
accesses to the protected memory pages based on the security
engine.
B. Automated Memory Area Allocation
We leverage system call reuse technology to automatically
allocate a kernel memory area. The system call reuse technol-
ogy is widely used by VMM to perform in-VM management
(such as killing processes and reading files). Since most of the
operating system’s critical operations are performed by system
calls, reusing the system calls of the target VM can help
VMM to control VM execution from outside automatically.
For instance, if we want to kill a process in VM, we can
inject the system call KILL with specific parameters to the
target VM.
The system call reuse technology usually injects a system
call to the target VM through a series of operations such as
modifying some registers and memory data when the VM
is invoking system call. After the injected system call has
been finished, VMM obtains the execution results and restores
execution context of the original system call. Then, the VM
kernel will execute original system call properly and finally
return to user space.
In a Linux operating system, programs can obtain and
release the kernel memory space with continuous physical
addresses by using kmalloc() and kfree(). By tracking the
kmalloc() and kfree() functions, we find that the main system
calls involved by them are MMAP and MUNMAP. MMAP
is responsible for mapping contents of a file to the memory
space of the process. After the mapping, process can read
or write the file by reading and writing the memory. By
Fig. 2. System Call Injection
using this system call, we can let the target VM allocate a
memory space through passing the specified memory address
and length. This memory can be used to store the migrated
kernel data. MUNMAP can release the memory mapping
created by MMAP, which contains two parameters: ’start’ (the
head address of memory to release) and ’length’ (the length
of memory to release).
The core idea of automatically allocating protected memory
area is to use system call reuse to inject the MMAP into the
target VM and then get the execution results, which steps are
shown in Figure 2.
Step 1: Replacing the original system call.We replace the
first instruction of the system call entrance with INT3 instruc-
tion by re-writing the target VM memory. When processes
invoke system calls, the target VM will reach the system call
entrance. Then, INT3 instruction will trigger a VMExit event
and the control will be transferred to VMM. After saving the
context, including related memory and register content, we
replace the register content and related memory content with
the parameters of the injected system call. Finally, the target
VM is resumed and executes the injected system call.
Step 2: Obtaining the injected system call results. Simi-
larly, we also replace the system call exit instruction with INT3
instruction, which can intercept the the return of the injected
system call. When the injected system call is finished, the
target VM will be suspended. At this time, we can obtain the
execution results from VMM, which include related register
and memory content.
Step 3: Recovering the original system call. After success-
fully obtaining the corresponding results, we restore the orig-
inal system call context by setting the corresponding registers
and memory to the previously saved execution information.
Then, the EIP is set to the system call entrance. Therefore,
the target VM will execute the original system call and return
to user space.
With the system call reuse technology, we can complete two
tasks: a) Insert a MMAP to get protected memory area starting
at specified kernel address. b) Use the MUNMAP to release
protected memory pages which are in free. Above all, we can
achieve the goal of automated memory area allocation.
Fig. 3. Relationship of Kernel Objects
C. Automated Object Migration
The migration process will be described with two use cases.
The first one is migrating dentry objects, another is migrating
file descriptor table (fdt).
Dentry Structure
Whenever a VM opens a new file, the operating system will
create a new dentry object. Every dentry object is placed on
the hash table ’dentry cache’. With the semantic knowledge
of the target VM operating system, we can obtain the address
of ’dentry cache’ in memory. Then, the head address of all
dentry objects can be obtained from the whole hash table. If
we want to migrate a dentry object, we can copy it to the
protected memory area. Since the length of a dentry object is
fixed, all of dentry objects can be continuously copied to the
protected memory pages.
After copying a dentry object, we need to modify the related
pointers. By analyzing dentry object, we can build a profile
of this object. The pointers related to dentry object can be
divided into three types, which are as follows:
1) External pointers to dentry object;
2) Internal pointers to internal addresses of dentry object;
3) Internal pointers to the next/previous dentry objects.
We handle these three types separately.
Type 1. There are many external pointers pointing to dentry
object. For instance, There is a field named ’f dentry’ in file
object (another important kernel object in filesystem), which
points to the related dentry object. The file object also has
a field named ’f inode’ pointing to the corresponding inode
object. Since related dentry and inode objects have pointers
linking each other, we can use these pointers to verify if we
get the right pointers. The relationship among inode, dentry,
and file is shown in Figure 3.
Type 2. Inside the dentry structure, there is a string pointer
named ’d name’ pointing to an internal memory field which
offset is fixed. This memory area stores the file/directory name.
After migration, we need to change these pointers to the new
addresses. Based on the profile, we are able to calculate and
rewrite the new address because the offset is fixed.
Type 3. Because the dentry objects are linked by doubly
linked list, we can find the next/previous nodes from the old
dentry object. After the migration, we need to change the
corresponding fields of them to make sure that they can reach
the migrated object.
After completing the dentry migration, we set the reference
count of the original dentry object to 0 and add the original
dentry object to LRU linked list. Finally, the operating system
will eventually release the data structure on the LRU linked
list.
File Descriptor Table
Every process in memory maintains a file descriptor table
(fdt), which contains many file descriptors(fd) pointing to the
opened files. The fdt address of each process can be obtained
via task struct→files→fdt. If we want to migrate this object,
it is easy to copy it to protected memory pages and modify
corresponding fdt pointers in the process structure. Actually,
the file descriptor table is an array of file pointers, which point
to every opened file of the process. The related pointer, which
points to this structure, is only in the process structure. So,
we just need to modify the corresponding pointer after the
migration.
D. Memory Operation Monitor
After the automated kernel object migration, the monitor
based on VMI can perform page-level monitoring on the target
memory pages. With the help of the Intel EPT technology, we
can easily monitor all read/write operations on the protected
memory area. In our implementation, LIBVMI is used to help
us to perform VM page-level monitoring. LIBVMI is a VMI
c-library, which makes it easier to monitor behaviors of VM.
By registering the monitoring events of the target memory
pages, it will trigger a memory event when VM operation
system reads or writes the corresponding kernel objects. The
listener outside VM can obtain the details of the event through
the callback function then analyze the behaviors based on the
policy engine.
E. Analysis & Discussion
Our system is secure, because it runs in VMM. Compared
with traditional approaches of directly monitoring the memory
pages, which include target kernel objects, our approach has
a lower overhead and better performance.
To further ensure the migration security, cloning the target
VM is another possible way to test the effectiveness. Before
the migration, we can clone the target VM and perform the
migration. Then, we can let the cloned VM access these files
to check if there are some errors. If no error is triggered, we
can perform the migration in the target VM. To let VM access
files, we can also leverage system call reuse technology, which
injects OPEN and READ system calls into the cloned VM.
Kernel object monitoring faces some security challenges.
A sophisticated attacker may firstly get the root privilege of
the target VM, and then he could also migrate the target
kernel object to another kernel space. This attack may make
the kernel object monitor useless, because the monitor only
monitors the target object’s memory area, not including the
related pointers. But, this challenge can be addressed by many
ways. In most of cases, the attackers have to read the old object
to migrate it to other place, which will trigger the monitor. For
instance, the attacker needs to firstly get the content of the
target file’s dentry and then copy it to another kernel space,
which will trigger the read monitoring. Monitoring the virtual
file /dev/mem is another possible way, because most of kernel
modifications are performed by using this file.
Monitoring the lifecycle of the target kernel object is
necessary for kernel-object-based monitors. Related work [5]
has already proposed the solve method, which keeps the object
alive in the VM kernel.
IV. EVALUATION
After implementation, we evaluate the prototype system to
test the the effectiveness, performance and overhead. We use
a 3.4GHz Intel i7 CPU computer with 8GB memory as the
testbed, supporting Intel VT. Xen is selected as the VMM,
which is a widely used hypervisor. The operating systems of
Dom0 and the target VM are Ubuntu 16.04 x64 and Ubuntu
12.04 x64 respectively. The target VM is configured with 1
VCPU and 512 MB memory.
A. Effectiveness
Dentry Object
There are two test programs named ’dentry test 1’ and
’dentry test 2’ inside the target VM. Both two programs have
the same task: opening the file ’test.txt’ in write-only mode,
then waiting for the user to type a single character.
We run the test program ’dentry test 1’ in the target VM,
then we pause the VM when it is waiting for a user to
type in. At this time, we allocate the protected memory
area in the target VM, then the memory migration module
starts to migrate the dentry object of ’test.txt’. It obtains the
corresponding dentry object, and the reference count is 1,
which means this file is accessed by one process now. Then,
this object is migrated to the protected memory pages, and
the related pointers are redirected. Finally, the target VM is
resumed, and the memory monitor starts.
After the migration, we run ’dentry test 2’. This program
opens the same file and waits for a user to type in. When
the file is accessed, our monitor is triggered, which means
the program is accessing the migrated object. After resuming
the VM, we find that the monitored dentry object is referenced
by two programs, and the reference number is two. This result
can prove the correctness and effectiveness of the dentry object
migration.
File Descriptor Table
We build a test program named ’fdt test’ in the target VM.
The test program opens a file called ’fdt 1.txt’, then it waits
for a user to type a characters and opens another file called
’fdt 2.txt’.
When the target VM has opened ’fdt 1.txt’ and is waiting
for user, we start to migrate the fdt to the protected memory
pages. The steps are similar with those of dentry. At this
time, the fdt has four fd entries, among which the fd of
’fdt 1.txt’ is 3. After resuming the target VM and starting
the memory monitor, the program opens a new file ’fdt 2.txt’.
This operation triggers our memory monitor, and the new entry
of ’fdt 2.txt’ in fdt is 4. From this result, we can know the
migration of fdt is successful.
B. Performance
In the performance evaluation, we want to test the perfor-
mance impact of real-time monitoring on the target VM. Since
monitoring dentry objects will introduce high overhead to
the target VM’s filesystem, we test our system’s performance
with monitoring dentry objects. By using the benchmark of
extracting the compressed file of Linux kernel, we evaluate the
target VM’s filesystem performance when monitoring different
numbers of dentry objects before and after object migration.
We compare our system with CFWatcher [5], which monitors
dentry objects to intercept file access. The entire test can be
divided into the following three steps:
Step 1: Turn off page monitoring and test the target VM’s
filesystem performance by extracting the compressed file.
Step 2: Select different numbers of kernel objects, then
perform memory page read/write monitoring on the memory
pages where the kernel object is located. At this time, we test
the target VM’s filesystem performance. This is actually what
CFWatcher does.
Step 3: All of the kernel objects in Step 2 are migrated to the
newly created and protected memory area. Then, the protected
memory area is monitored for read and write operations. After
that, we test the performance of the target VM to compare with
CFWatcher.
We choose the kernel time of extracting compressed file
as the benchmark of read/write performance of the target
VM. For Step 1, we test 10 times and compute the average
value, which is used as the baseline data. Then, we select
and monitor different magnitudes of dentry objects (10, 50,
100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350 and 400) to test the performance
with dentry monitoring. For each object count, we first test
the performance without migration (Step 2), and then test the
performance with migration (Step 3). Each step is tested for 10
times and the average is calculated, which results are shown
in Figure 4.
From the results, we can find that when monitoring a
large number of dentry objects, the overhead of non-migration
method is high. In contrast, the overhead of our system is very
low. But we can find that our system still introduces overhead
to the target VM, that is because some of the monitored objects
are accessed by other processes. If the selected objects are not
touched by any other processes, the runtime overhead will be
nearly zero. Actually, this overhead is related to the number of
VMExit events triggered by the target VM, which relationship
is shown in Figure 5. Our system can significantly reduce the
number of VMExit events.
C. Overhead
The main overhead of our system is extra memory occupa-
tion. Since the monitored objects need to be migrated to the
Fig. 4. Relationship between Extracting Time and Object Number
Fig. 5. Relationship between Extracting Time and Event Number
protected memory area, this memory area will occupy extra
memory in the target VM. In our design, the migrated objects
are continuously distributed, so the memory needs not to be
very large. In the experiment, when monitoring 400 dentry
objects, we leverage 32 pages as the protected memory area,
which size is 128 KB.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a low-overhead VM kernel object
monitoring method for VMI, which migrates the target kernel
objects to the isolated memory area to reduce the runtime
overhead. By leveraging system call reuse technology, the
protected kernel memory area is built automatically. Then,
we migrate the target kernel objects by leveraging automated
pointer redirection technology. Finally, these memory pages
are monitored to intercept memory accesses. The experimental
results prove our system’s effectiveness and performance. In
the future, we are going to apply this approach to monitor
more kinds of kernel objects.
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